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Cross-Border Insider Trading 
Donald C. Langevoort* 
Some forty years have now passed since the United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) began seriously to 
attack the problem of insider trading in its seminal Cady, Roberts 
decision.! Since then, a complex pattern of regulation has evolved, 
largely through a common law process of judicial interpretation of 
the open-ended antifraud provision of the federal securities laws, 
Rule 10b-5. While many interpretive questions still remain open, 
U.S. law in this area broadly prohibits trading based on material 
non public information when: 
(1) the trader directly or indirectly owes a fiduciary duty to 
marketplace traders on the other side of the transaction;2 
(2) the trader has misappropriated the information from a 
source to which he owes some kind of fiduciary duty;3 or 
(3) the trader possesses tender-offer related information 
derived from either the bidder or the target.4 
These prohibitions on trading carry with them a corresponding duty 
to refrain from "tipping" others. If this is violated, the "tippee" can 
be held liable as a co-venturer with the tipper/insider.s 
As far back as the early 1980's, the SEC began to act against 
instances of cross-border insider trading: situations where the 
pattern of trading involved some conduct outside the United 
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, DC. 
1. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907 (1961); Donald C. Langevoort, 
Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of Insider Trading Regulation, 
99 COLUM. L. REv. 1319 (1999). Before Cady, Roberts, only Section 16 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 sought to address the insider trading problem, 
and it was substantially limited in scope. 
2. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
3. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
4. Securities Exchange Act of 1934,15 U.S.c. § 78, Rule 14e-3. 
5. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). The test used in Dirks is (1) whether 
the insider was breaching a fiduciary duty by seeking a personal benefit via the 
tipping and (2) whether the tippee knew or had reason to know of the breach. 
Whether this awkward test applies in misappropriation cases is open to debate. 
161 
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States.6 In a number of such cases, foreign persons used foreign 
brokerage accounts to trade in the securities of multi-national 
companies on the New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ. In 
1999, for example, the SEC brought a case involving trading by an 
Italian portfolio manager through the Swiss office of a brokerage 
firm in the stock of a Netherlands corporation that was the subject 
of a takeover bid by a Swiss company.7 The incidence of cross-
border insider trading cases is, of course, what led the SEC to begin 
to negotiate memoranda of understanding with various countries to 
facilitate their investigation. 
We are seeing an increasing stream of such cases. That should 
not be surprising in light of the increasing globalization of the 
securities markets and the rapid increase in the number of cross-
border mergers and acquisitions-the setting in which the largest 
insider trading temptation exists.8 As persons from various 
countries become involved in the confidential negotiation or 
planning of such deals, the locus of insider trading problems 
spreads. 
Currently, there is no formal SEC policy on when U.S. insider 
trading rules (or indeed Rule lOb-5 generally) will be applied 
extraterritorially. If one can glean anything from SEC action 
during the last twenty years, it is that the trading site-the use of 
U.S. market mechanisms-that counts most.9 Certainly, neither the 
trader nor the issuer need be U.S.-based. What I wish to do in this 
paper is articulate what I think is sensible enforcement policy for a 
nation-whether the U.S. or any other-to adopt. By this, I do not 
want to focus on the question of the extent of a country's 
jurisdiction to prescribe in accordance with the dictates of 
6. See SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italania, 92 F.R.D. 111 (1981); Pitt, 
Hardison & Shapiro, Problems of Enforcement in the Multinational Securities 
Markets, 9 U. PA. J. INT'LBus. L. 375 (1987). 
7. SEC v. Euro Security Fund, [1999 Tr. Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 
par. 90,433 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). The trading was on the New York Stock Exchange, 
and the principal office of the brokerage firm used to execute the trades was in 
New York. 
8. See Roberta S. Karmel, Transnational Takeover Talk-Regulations 
Relating to Tender Offers and Insider Trading in the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Germany and Australia, 66 U. CINN. L. REv. 1133 (1998). 
9. The fact that shares of the company in question are traded in the U.S. 
means both that domestic market mechanisms are being abused. Presumably, U.S. 
interest on these grounds could also come from the fact that there is substantial 
U.S. investor interest and ownership of shares traded on domestic markets. The 
1989 EC Directive on Insider Trading is similarly vague, although it clearly confers 
jurisdiction on the country where the trading occurred. 
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international law. lO Familiar principles of international law give 
immense scope to jurisdiction, permitting enforcement either when 
conduct in question occurs in substantial part in the regulating 
country or has significant effects in that country. But clearly, either 
through prosecutorial restraint or judicial limitation, a nation can 
choose to give lesser scope as a matter of prudence, comity and the 
wise expenditure of limited investigatory resources. l1 
This is an issue that all sophisticated capital marketplace 
nations ought think through. But I recognize that at present, at 
least, the U.S. is the most likely nation to act extraterritorially, even 
when insider trading laws exist in the other nations involved. Four 
things tempt a country like the U.S. to extend its insider trading 
jurisdiction. First, conduct might be unlawful domestically, but not 
unlawful in the country to which the jurisdictional reach is directed. 
This is possible, though in light of the rapid evolution of insider 
trading laws throughout the world, not necessarily likely.12 Second 
-and more likely-it is conceivable that the action might be 
unlawful where it occurred, but the local authorities do not seem 
likely to take action against it. One of the most obviously, and 
troubling, phenomena in international securities regulation is that 
even as the "law on the books" in most developed countries 
converges on a common model, the commitment of surveillance 
and enforcement resources varies considerably.i3 It remains 
primitive in many nations-perhaps deliberately so. Third, even if 
local authorities take an interest, their enforcement tools may not 
10. I have addressed this elsewhere. See Donald C. Langevoort, Schoenbaum 
Revisited: Limiting the Scope of Antifraud Protection in an Internationalized 
Securities Market, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., no. 4, at 241 (1992). 
11. By and large, the courts have not pruned the extraterritorial scope of the 
law to incorporate comity limits, though they could do so. For a call in this 
direction, see Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 148 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
12. So far as the U.S. is concerned, its law may actually be more restricted than 
that in certain other countries that have addressed the problem via comprehensive 
statutory reform, such as Australia. See James Cox, An Outsider's Perspective of 
Insider Trading Regulation in Australia, 12 SYDNEY L. REV. 455 (1990). Because 
U.S. law takes something of a common law form, it is difficult to state with 
precision what it covers and what it does not. 
13. See Barry Rider, Policing the International Financial Markets: An English 
Perspective, 16 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 179 (1990). Obviously, politics plays an 
important role. E.g., Resignation of Enforcement Staff Throws Stock Exchange 
into Crisis, 6 WORLD SEC. L. REP. (BNA) no. 3, at 24 (Mar. 2000) (surveillance 
staff at Philippine Stock Exchange resigns to protest political interference with 
insider trading case). For an empirical demonstration of the importance of active 
enforcement as opposed to mere law-adoption, see Utpal Bhattacharya & Hazem 
Daouk, The World Price of Insider Trading (unpublished manuscript, Indiana 
University) (2000) (showing that positive stock price effects of insider trading 
regulation come upon enforcement, not adoption of the rules). 
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be up to the task.14 Most countries still use criminal law as their 
primary weapon against insider trading, creating prosecutorial 
difficulties in complex cases based largely on circumstantial 
evidence. Countries that use civil remedies (like the U.S.) may be 
able to sanction conduct that even their willing regulatory brethren 
cannot. Finally, the decision to extend jurisdiction might simply be 
a matter of enforcement efficiency: in a complicated case touching 
on multiple countries, having one regulator exercise primary 
jurisdiction over all the related conduct, no matter where it 
occurred, may be the least costly form of proceeding. IS 
I. National Interests at Stake in Insider Trading Regulation 
When an insider trading case has a multi-national dimension, 
there are four major pieces of information needed to assess a claim 
of appropriate jurisdiction.16 The first is the nationalities of the 
traders, as well as the tippers when there was some improper 
dissemination of the information leading to trading. The second is 
the nationality of the issuer.17 Third, we need to know where the 
information was obtained (i.e., where the source of the information 
was located). Last, we need to know where the trading occurred-
what market mechanisms were used?18 Where the answers to most 
of those questions are a single country, the case for claiming 
jurisdiction is easy. When the answers are scattered, it is harder. 
Obviously, there are many possible permutations. To focus the 
analysis, I will pose a single hypothetical case. Imagine that a 
British company is negotiating to acquire a Brazilian company. An 
attorney whose firm in London is advising the acquiring company 
on certain aspects of the transaction tips a friend in Sweden. The 
Swedish friend purchases securities in the Brazilian company on the 
New York Stock Exchange. Here we have four countries whose 
14. See Markus Kroll & Rahel Gimmel, Acquittal in Insider Trading Case 
Reinforces Concerns About Rules, 6 WORLD SEC. L. REP. (BNA), no. 2, at 8 (Feb. 
2000) (expressing doubts about effectiveness of Swiss law). 
15. Similarly, once an investigation has begun that involves largely domestic 
activity, the discovery of some foreign element brings an almost irresistible 
temptation to pursue the one trading overseas. 
16. For other efforts to work through this problem, whether as a matter of law 
or policy, see Merritt Fox, Insider Trading in a Globalizing Market: Who Should 
Regulate What?, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., no. 4, at 263 (1992); Ronald E. 
Bornstein & N. Elaine Dugger, International Regulation of Insider Trading, 1987 
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 375. 
17. Here, we might consider both the site of its incorporation and its principal 
place of business. 
18. That is, what exchange or trading system was the trade executed on, and 
what broker-dealers or other intermediary was used to execute it. 
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interests are at stake; the question is whose interests are strongest, 
and why. 
To address this, it is necessary to think first about why insider 
trading is regulated in the first place. Indeed, one reason for going 
through this exercise, apart from its practical importance in our 
global economy, is that it forces some rigorous inquiry into a 
question that is rarely thought about very hard outside the 
academic community. In the United States, the gradual strength-
ening of the prohibition against insider trading, and the devotion of 
a good bit of enforcement resources to combating it, has been as 
much a form of cultural expression as economic regulation. That is 
not to say that there are not good functional reasons to ban the 
most abusive forms of insider trading. As we shall see, there 
probably are. But the issue in the U.S. has a symbolic, indeed 
almost mythic, character.19 The ban on insider trading is a highly 
salient statement about the subordinate place of insider-fiduciaries 
(and their friends and associates) vis-a-vis the trading public. It 
flips the hierarchy-the power of economic elites-that otherwise 
appears to dominate. In this sense, it is a "brand" message to 
advertise the openness of the American securities markets to public 
investors by creating the image these investor interests are 
paramount. It would be presumptuous of me to say whether insider 
trading regulation in other countries plays the same rhetorical 
role.20 I would at least venture a guess that many countries have 
simply (and without deep thought) mimicked the V.S. 21 system of 
regulation in their own brand-building efforts to create domestic 
securities markets of reasonable depth and liquidity, without giving 
that much thought as to why. 
II. The Rationales for Insider Trading Regulation 
The academic debate over the regulation of insider trading has 
had a long and fascinating intellectual history. Initially, the 
19. See Langevoort, Rereading Cady, Roberts, supra note 1, at 1328-31. 
20. In a recent article, Barry Rider complains that Great Britain has not 
thought through its reasons for insider trading regulation and enforcement all that 
well either. See Barry A.K. Rider, The Control of Insider Trading: Smoke and 
Mirrors!, 1 INT'L& COMPo CORP. L.J. 271 (1999). 
21. The U.S. is not alone, of course. In terms of chronology, France was the 
other major capital marketplace nation to address insider trading in the 1960's. 
See James Lightburn, Insider Trading in France, 7 INT'L FIN. L. REV. 23 (Jan. 
1988). Canada (in the Province of Ontario) and Australia also took significant and 
influential statutory steps toward regulation during that decade. See Stephen 
Herne, Inside Information: Definitions in Australia, Canada, the U.K. and the U.S., 
8 J. COMPo Bus. & CAP. MKT. L. 1 (1986). 
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appropriateness of the ban· in the U.S. was simply taken as a 
political given; little thought was given to the "why" question. 
Indeed, the genesis of modern insider trading regulation in the U.S. 
began when a law professor, William Cary, was appointed chairman 
of the SEC in 1961.22 His decision to federalize the law of insider 
trading was explicitly based on a desire to superimpose a strong 
fiduciary ethic on the U.S. stock markets, to distinguish them from 
the elites-dominated markets in other countries. By the late 1960's, 
however, an intellectual counter-attack was mounted against insider 
trading prohibition. It was led by Henry Manne, whose influence is 
still felt today.23 Through the early 1980's, academics increasingly 
doubted whether insider trading regulation was worth the effort, if 
not outright dysfunctiona1.24 But in the 1980's, there was a 
noticeable turn-around, as more and more economics-oriented 
scholars began to identify reasons to favor some sort of regulation.25 
Today, the balance of sophisticated legal commentary is in favor of 
insider trading regulation, though even among its supporters there 
remains vigorous debate over exactly what scope and form the 
regulation should take.26 . 
The standard explanations for a ban on insider trading fall into 
two main categories. 
A. Investor Protection 
The first, and most conventional, is investor protection. The 
initial focus here was on the harm to contemporaneous marketplace 
traders who sold to or bought from the insider at an informational 
disadvantage. These appear to be the most visible persons 
exploited by the insider. This argument· has long been seen as 
22. See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET (2d ed. 
1995). 
23. See HENRY MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966). 
For a recent celebration of Manne's contributions, see Symposium: The Legacy of 
Henry G. Manne- Pioneer in Law & Economics and Innovation in Legal 
Education, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. (1999). 
24. E.g., Michael Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. 
L. REv. 1 (1980). 
25. A key step here was the work of perhaps the most influential conservative 
law and economics scholar, Frank Easterbrook. See Frank Easterbrook, Insider 
Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges and the Production of Information, 
1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309. 
26. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation: The Path 
Dependent Choice Between Property Rights and Securities Fraud, 52 SMU L. REV. 
1589, 1620 (1999). For a collection and analysis of the full range of arguments, see 
James D. Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting: A Reply to the Chicago School, 
1986 DUKE L.J. 628. 
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weak, however, in light of the workings of modern securities 
markets. Except in rare circumstances, these traders were not 
induced into the market by the insider, nor did they rely on any 
information generated by the insider. They independently entered 
their buy/sell orders, taking the foreseeable risk that there was 
some undisclosed information that might make their trade 
unprofitable. In other words, there is no real causation or reliance 
of the sort that would suggest fraud. Careful study of the market 
impact of insider trading has led to the conclusion that so far as 
contemporaneous traders are concerned, the most plausible story of 
harm that can be told is that the insiders might crowd out other 
persons on the same side of the transaction who might have bought 
or sold at a somewhat more favorable price.27 
The inquiry has thus shifted to a revised statement of the 
problem: how do traders respond ex ante to the risk that there may 
be insiders in the market with an access-based informational 
advantage? Here, we can see one group of persons who are 
adversely affected-specialists and marketmakers whose constant 
buy/sell activity essentially forces. them to internalize the risk that 
some who seek to trade with them have an informational 
advantage.28 The rational response of the professional trader is to 
widen the bid-ask spread so as to incorporate a risk premium. This, 
in turn, has a spillover adverse effect on others who trade with 
them, by delivering inferior pricing. If this argument is right, as 
many financial economists argue, then we do have a rationale for 
regulation so long as the costs of enforcement are less than the 
gains in terms of reduced spreads.29 A recent Indiana University 
study, for example, estimates the average cost of capital benefit of 
enforced insider trading regulation for nations that have recently 
become insider trading regulators at approximately 5%, a 
statistically significant figure.30 
What about the ex ante behavior of public investors? Will they 
either withdraw from the market for fear of insider trading, 
reducing its depth and liquidity? The economic argument here is 
27. See William Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic Information on 
Impersonal Stock Markets: Who is Harmed and Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC 
Rule IOb-5?, 54 So. CAL. L. REV. 1217 (1981). 
28. See Lawrence R. Glosten, Insider Trading, Liquidity and the Role of 
Monopoly Specialists, 62 J. Bus. 211 (1989). See also Nicholas Georgakopoulos, 
Insider Trading as a Transaction Cost: A Market Microstructure Justification and 
Optimization of Insider Trading Regulation, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1 (1993). 
29. On enforcement in this context, see Paul Demarzo et al., The Optimal 
Enforcement of Insider Trading Regulations, 106 J. POL. ECON. 602 (1998). 
30. Bhattacharya & Daouk, supra note 13. 
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quite complex, but there is little affirmative support for the idea of 
anything near complete withdrawal, even though any impact on the 
cost of equity will presumably affect demand to some extent. The 
Indiana University study gives a 5% figure for the impact of 
enforced regulation, reflecting the average market price effect of 
the first prosecution. To be sure, a more sustained pattern of 
enforcement might well raise the number by some unknown 
amount. Nonetheless, I suspect that the ultimate figure would not 
be that much higher. 
To me, the real question that investors face is not insider 
trading standing alone but rather the quality of regulation (or 
market forces) that cause issuers to publicize information fairly 
promptly. In a world that reliably forces prompt public disclosure 
through either legal regulation or market discipline, the risk faced 
by traders because of the possible presence of insider trading 
should be limited.3 ! Severe concern about insider trading should 
occur largely in environments of very low transparency, and on 
close inspection, it is the lack of transparency, far more than the 
insider activity, that should drive the regulatory response. 
Yet concern about "investor confidence" in the face of insider 
trading remains, in the U.S. at least, the express motivation behind 
an aggressive system of regulation-even in a setting of high 
transparency. This rhetoric, which has become at times almost a 
moral crusade, echoes repeatedly in the cases running from Cady, 
Roberts in 1961 through the Supreme Court's most recent endorse-
ment of expansive insider trading regulation in United States v. 
O'Hagan.32 As I suggested earlier, I think the idea that insider 
trading regulation is necessary to retain the confidence of public 
investors in the American markets something more of a "brand 
slogan" than a well-grounded empirical prediction. 
But still, this does not mean that it is an unjustifiable 
regulatory step. First, there remains the technical connection 
between the interests of public investors and stock price spreads, 
which are affected by the adverse selection risks of insider trading. 
My only critical point was that it is hard to ground the aggressive 
kind of insider trading regulation one finds in the U.S. at this level 
of subtlety. A 5% (or even 10%) effect on cost of capital justifies 
intervention, even if it does not warrant a moral crusade. Second, 
31. The close connection between mandatory disclosure and insider trading is 
well illustrated by the SEC's recent proposal for Regulation FD, which would 
demand prompt public disclosure anytime there was intentional or inadvertent 
selective disclosure to a favored investor or analyst. 
32. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642. 
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investors may actually respond in various ways to myths and 
symbols, beyond the rational content of the underlying message.33 
Insider trading regulation may be good advertising and public 
relations, whatever the discrete economic benefits it delivers.34 In 
the end, this latter point may well be the best descriptive 
explanation of the rationale behind the U.S. system so far as 
investor protection is concerned. 
B. Corporate Law 
The foregoing argument actually splits academics interested in 
the law and finance. Many are uncomfortable with the "brand" 
argument as too soft to work in the rational world of investing-or 
if they are not believers in market rationality, too far removed from 
the emotions that really moves public investors: greed, herd 
instincts and so forth. As to the bid-ask spread argument, the 
question of whether costly and inevitably imperfect enforcement 
can efficiently deliver lower spreads is debated.35 
Nevertheless, many such scholars come to support regulation 
for a separate reason, namely, that it is the issuer's best interests to 
do so. A regime in which insider trading is permissible poses a 
number of problems from a corporate law perspective. First (and 
probably foremost), insider trading can compromise the 
confidentiality of sensitive information that is privileged from 
mandatory disciosure,36 such as the existence of preliminary merger 
negotiations. Efforts at secrecy can be broken when unusual stock 
price trading has occurred in advance of any announcement, 
33. Obviously, this question is closely related to the debate over market 
efficiency. See Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions and Securities 
Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851 (1992). I do not 
want to make the strong claim that an insider trading ban is a necessary symbol, 
but rather an effective one for encouraging public investment generally. See 
Langevoort, Rereading Cady, Roberts, supra note l. 
34. On the difficult balancing problems, see Khanna et aI., Insider Trading, 
Outside Search and Resource Allocation: Why Firms and Society May Disagree on 
Insider Trading Restrictions, 7 REV. FIN. STUD. 575 (1994). Beyond the public 
interest arguments, one can also claim that insider trading prohibitions work to the 
private pecuniary benefit of some large investors. See David Haddock & Jonathan 
Macey, A Coasian Model of Insider Trading Regulation, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 1449 
(1987). 
35. This is an important point-insider trading enforcement is very costly, 
especially if a jurisdiction wants to pursue a large portion of suspicious trades. For 
a criticism emphasizing this cost of insider trading regulation and enforcement, see 
Dooley, supra note 24. 
36. See Kenneth Scott, Insider Trading: Rule lOb-5, Disclosure and Corporate 
Privacy, 9 J. LEG. STUD. 801 (1980). 
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exposing the issuer to intense press, market and regulatory scrutiny. 
Second, confidential information is a valuable form of corporate 
property.37 Allowing insiders to profit from it a form of waste-
irrational from the issuer's perspective unless there is a discrete 
trade off for a lowered salary.38 Third, permitting insider trading 
gives key executives an incentive to create volatility in the 
company's stock price, since they can profit from downswings as 
well as upswings. From these points, we might predict that rational 
issuers would seek to bar insider trading if they could.39 
Two further points connect the foregoing to more traditional 
concerns of investor protection. One is that permitting insider 
trading gives company officials an incentive to delay the release of 
information to the markets for longer than the business needs of 
the company would suggest. Thus, there is a linkage between 
insider trading regulation and the quality of the disclosure regime.40 
The other goes back to ex ante reputation. If marketplace traders 
(professional or otherwise) fear insider trading, they will demand a 
risk premium, reflected in a lower stock price. In contrast, the 
issuer's cost of capital improves as the risk premium diminishes. 
This is simply the mirror image of the investor-protection point 
made earlier.41 
III. Connecting National Jurisdiction to Investor and Corporate 
Interests 
With the foregoing in mind, our task now is to decide which of 
the four countries in our hypothetical- Sweden, Britain, Brazil, or 
the U.S. - have good grounds to assert jurisdiction over the trading 
in question. On the assumption that it is quite costly to devote 
37. This point is emphasized in Judge Winter's opinion in United States v. 
Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991). 
38. See ROBERT CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 274-75 (1986). 
39. One question posed by critics of regulation is why don't they on their own. 
See Dennis Carlton & Daniel Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. 
L. REV. 857 (1983). One answer seems to be that they lack the surveillance 
capacity to make such a private prohibition stick. In other words, there is a public 
goods character to market surveillance. 
40. See Robert Haft, The Effect of Insider Trading Rules on the Internal 
Efficiency of the Large Corporation, 80 MICH. L. REv. 1051 (1982). 
41. In addition to these points, Merritt Fox has made the forceful argument 
that insider trading prohibitions are appropriate as a control on agency costs, 
which is important no so much in the name of investor or corporate protection but 
because of the compelling regulatory interest in a fair system of allocating capital 
and other economic resources among the various issuers in an economy. See Fox, 
supra note 16; see also Merritt Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: 
Who Should Regulate Whom?, 95 MICH. L. REv. 2498 (1997). 
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enforcement resources to the detection and prosecution of insider 
trading, we should also look fairly closely at the extent to which 
there will be domestic benefits that exceed the costs. Following 
standard economic analysis, if the benefits of regulation spill over 
to other countries without a comparable regime of cost-sharing, we 
would expect enforcement to occur with less frequency than is 
optimal (the classic externalities and "free rider" problem).42 In this 
sense, finding the best enforcer is really one of finding which 
country benefits the most in terms of domestic economic policy 
from the enforcement.43 
A. Sweden: The Trader's Homeland 
None of the interests described above justify any strong claim 
of Swedish jurisdiction. Neither its investors nor its companies are 
involved (if there are Swedish investors in the Brazilian 
corporation, it is by happenstance, and gives Sweden no greater 
interest than any other country whose investors own shares in that 
issuer). The only possible linkage might be that Sweden believes 
that its reputation in the world of investing might be tarnished by 
the impression that it acts as a "Barbary Coast" for securities 
pirates. In fact, in the U.S. that concern alone is sometimes invoked 
to justify the exercise of jurisdiction as a legal matter.44 The U.S. 
applies the securities laws to domestic conduct sufficient to state a 
claim under Rule lOb-5 even when all of the harm is abroad. While 
there may be some cases where that is a form of good citizenship in 
the world of securities regulation, my sense is that the claim is fairly 
42. For a study of the game theoretic problems of international securities 
regulation flowing from the jurisdictional mismatch of costs and benefits, with 
special attention to insider trading, see Amir Licht, Games Commissions Play: 2x2 
Games of International Securities Regulation, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 61, 114-25 (1999); 
Amir Licht, Regulatory Arbitrage for Real: International Securities Regulation in a 
World of Interacting Securities Markets, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 563 (1998). 
43. One might properly ask whether jurisdiction should properly belong to any 
country whose investors were trading "on the other side" of the insider. Indeed, 
the U.S. and some other countries engage in the presumption that it is the 
"contemporaneous traders" who are the victims of the insider. However, a few 
points about this deserve emphasis. First, there is a fictional element to it: the 
contemporaneous traders are probably not really the victims of anything 
resembling fraud. Second, to the extent one wants to take this into account, it will 
probably be subsumed in the interests of the country of residency-that country 
will in all likelihood be the one with the greatest number of investors. To the 
extent that we say that any country with a significant number of contemporaneous 
traders should bring suit, the possibility for duplication and conflict is severe. 
44. See United States v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 110 (3d Cir. 1977); A VC 
Nederland B.V. v. Atrium Inv. Part., 740 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1984). 
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weak in the insider trading context-especially if one of the other 
countries is willing and able to prosecute. Sweden might owe some 
other country a duty of regulatory cooperation in the latter 
country's investigation of the trading, but that strikes me as the 
extent of its appropriate involvement. 
B. Britain: The Source Country 
Britain has two interests in the problem at hand: it is home of 
the tipper and of the acquiring company. It is also the place where 
a theft of confidential information occurred. Simply from an 
efficiency perspective, most of the initial investigatory work that 
would have to be done in the case would be concentrated in Britain, 
because the circumstances surrounding the obtaining and subse-
quent use of the information tends to be the heart of an insider 
trading case. 
Britain clearly has good cause to prosecute on some grounds. 
We have a case of theft of information by a fiduciary, which alone 
justifies jurisdiction. But the question is whether enforcement on 
that basis is tied to any element of securities regulation. To be sure, 
the situation described here is a standard "misappropriation" case. 
The U.S. Supreme Court, in the O'Hagan decision, squarely held 
that Rule lOb-5 is violated when a person defrauds the source of the 
information by secretly lining his pockets via insider trading while 
pretending to be a loyal fiduciary. In the Court's eyes, the victims 
were both the acquiring company (which, by the way, was a British 
entity) and the trader's employer, a Minneapolis law firm that had 
been retained by the acquiror. Following this logic, there would 
seem to be a compelling case for jurisdiction whenever the sources 
of the information are domestic-even if the trading occurs abroad. 
Indeed, I would predict that the SEC would bring this case under 
Rule lOb-5 were it in Britain's shoes. But should it? My sense is 
that a careful reading of O'Hagan indicates that even though the 
victims were the sources of the information, the justification for 
regulation under the securities laws was that allowing trading 
profits based on misappropriated information threatens the 
integrity of the trading markets.45 In O'Hagan, all the trading was 
domestic: the issuer, Pillsbury, was a Minneapolis-based multi-
national. If that is the message of the decision, there would be no 
cause to claim jurisdiction as a matter of securities regulation 
45. This point was made fairly explicitly by Justice Ginsburg. See Q'Hagen, 
supra note 3. 
HeinOnline -- 19 Dick. J. Int’l L. 173 2000-2001
2000] CRoss-BoRDER INSIDER TRADING 173 
absent some tie to the domestic markets. Moreover, because the 
acquiror is not the issuer, many of the reasons for limiting trading 
by insiders of the issuer (disclosure incentives, volatility incentives, 
etc.) simply do not apply to provide "corporate" justifications for 
regulation. 
Still, Britain might be able to make a sound reputational 
argument in a case like this. The reputation of the acquiring 
company within the investment community is a matter in which 
Britain could legitimately take an interest under the rubric of 
securities law. Even stronger would be its interest in the reputation 
for probity of the many players (investment banks, law firms, 
accounting firms and the like) who facilitate merger and acquisition 
transactions and other forms of securities activities in Britain. 
Building a financial infrastructure that has a brand image of 
honesty and loyalty is key for any nation seeking a significant role 
in the world's capital marketplace. 
C. Brazil: Home a/the Issuer 
To be sure, Brazil's interest here is less than it would be if the 
leak or tip took place through the issuer's own activities, but it is 
still substantial. Most importantly, Brazil has an interest in the 
capital marketplace reputation of its companies for controlling 
agency costs sufficiently well that investors can take equity 
positions with reasonable confidence. This, in turn, serves its 
interest in allocative efficiency as well.46 True, here the issuer has 
done nothing that could possibly have compromised its reputation. 
But ex ante, it is the risk of information exploitation (from 
whatever source) that investors react to, and thus Brazil's interest 
extends to the full range of abuses. We can add to this the 
prediction-perhaps true on average today, though diminishing 
gradually-that the largest percentage of investors in the Brazilian 
corporation are Brazilians themselves, giving Brazil the greatest 
claim to the extent that the rhetoric of protecting the person on the 
other side of the trade continues to prevail. 
Obviously, if the tip had come from within the Brazilian 
company, as in the typical insider trading case, Brazil's interest 
would strengthen considerably. Then there would be a 
combination of the interests that here are divided up between 
Brazil and Britain: namely, the interests in property protection, the 
reputation of the financial infrastructure, etc. 
46. See supra note 40. 
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D. The United States: Site of the Transaction 
As we saw before, the SEC seems to view the site of the 
transaction as having primary importance so far as the assertion of 
jurisdiction is concerned, and it has reasonable grounds today for 
making this claim.47 To the extent that the concern about the 
integrity of the marketplace-the reputation of the trading 
mechanism":""is really what drives insider trading regulation, then 
the trading in our hypothetical plainly affects a significant U.S. 
interest. So, too, if we make our concern the more specific one of 
lowering bid-ask spreads on the domestic markets. Here, U.S. 
expenditure of enforcement resources on cross-border insider 
trading represents an investment in local brand quality and trading 
efficiency. It may be cost effective even if the issuers (and many of 
their investors) are foreign, so that the regulation benefits many 
non-U.S. persons as well.48 
Basing jurisdiction on trading market location has some 
enforcement efficiencies as well. The bringing of an insider trading 
case, in the U.S. at least, begins with the internal surveillance that is 
done on the New York Stock Exchange, the Amex and NASDAQ. 
It is then aided by the electronic record-keeping that the SEC 
demands from registered broker-dealers who route trades to these 
trading systems, which can be delivered quickly to the Commission 
and analyzed for evidence of trading clusters and other circum-
stantial evidence of insider trading. This exchange-oriented 
detection system fits well with the exercise of jurisdiction by the 
exchange'S country. 
As sensible from a policy perspective as all this seems, 
ilOwever, I find it conceptually problematic in light of the rapid 
fragmentation of the world's trading markets. Assume that the 
world markets gradually move to an integrated system of 
competing marketmakers, linked by a variety of communication 
networks that allow for the prompt execution and reporting of 
trades to some centralized disclosure system.49 Add to this the 
47. For a broad and powerful claim that securities market regulation is a key 
to worldwide convergence of securities law, see John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as 
History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and its 
Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 641 (1999). See also James D. Cox, Regulatory 
Duopoly in U.S. Securities Markets, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1200 (1999). 
48. As Coffee points out, there is a coherence argument here as well: it is 
awkward for the U.S. to make a strong moral claim against insider trading unless it 
says that all exchange-based insider trading is unlawful, regardless of the issuer's 
domicile. See Coffee, supra note 47, at 694-95 & n. 202. 
49. This is not implausible. See Press Release, Securities and Exchange 
HeinOnline -- 19 Dick. J. Int’l L. 175 2000-2001
2000] CRoss-BoRDER INSIDER TRADING 175 
growth of internet-based sites that investors could access directly, 
with trades being crossed internally unless better execution could 
be obtained elsewhere. These competing marketmakers and 
trading centers would exist in many different countries (or perhaps 
just the abstraction of cyberspace50), with no predictable pattern in 
terms of where any given trade would occur. 
In this setting, one thing is clear: the notion of a "listing" of a 
stock that is tied to a physical or electronic "place" where the 
majority (or even the largest percentage) of daily trading in that 
issuer's stock will occur collapses. Fragmentation means that 
trading occurs in a highly diffused environment. Besides the 
obvious difficulties that this poses for surveillance and invest-
igation,5! it raises the question of whether any given nation would 
find it economical to seek to enforce its insider trading rules based 
simply on the happenstance that a particular trade found its way to 
some system located within its borders. Given a broad diffusion in 
the benefits from insider trading regulation, there are massive free-
rider problems. 
There are two counterarguments to consider, however. One is 
that if, indeed, insider trading regulation lowers bid-ask spreads, 
then a nation might be able to give "its" domestic trading systems a 
competitive advantage, causing more trades to be routed there, 
making this system (and its surrounding institutions) more 
profitable. This, however, seems difficult to achieve in practice for 
several reasons. First, the difficulty of surveillance and enforce-
ment in a fragmented environment means that it will be hard to 
deliver a credible promise to limit insider trading. Further (but 
closely related to the foregoing), we would still have to ask 
precisely how much tangible benefit would come from aggressive 
enforcement by the trading site nation. If the amount of benefit is 
small, it may not offset other advantages (i.e., execution costs) 
offered by other sites, in which case trades will continue to move to 
those other locations notwithstanding suboptimal insider trading 
enforcement. In that event, general bid-ask spreads will remain 
sizable, because the marketmakers could not predict any systematic 
Commission, NYSE's Recision of Rule 390 and Commission Request for 
Comment on Market Fragmentation (Feb. 23, 2000), available at http://www.sec. 
gov/news/press/pressarchive/2000press.shtml (last visited March 27, 2001). 
50. On insider trading in cyberspace generally, see Robert A. Prentice, The 
Internet and Its Challenges for the Future of Insider Trading Regulation, 12 HARV. 
J. L. & TECH. 263 (1999). 
51. For a discussion, see Michael Mann et ai., International Agreements and 
Understandings for the Production of Information and Other Mutual Assistance, 29 
INT'LLAW. 780,837-38 (1992). 
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benefit from insider trading regulation when the trades could so 
easily end up in a place without a well-woven regulatory net. 
The second possibility-which is gaining considerable attention 
in academic circles in the U.S.-is to decouple the idea of a "listing" 
from an expected trading site and simply make it a regulatory 
commitment.s2 That is, issuers from around the world could elect to 
be covered by U.S. (or any other country's) securities law, including 
its system of insider trading regulation and enforcement. To 
finance this, there would be some sort of taxation. Foreign issuers 
would choose to pay this, and be subject to the resulting 
enforcement risks, if they perceived that the U.S. (or other 
country's) "brand" of securities regulation delivered more value in 
terms of higher stock prices and lowered cost of capital. Some 
commentators have suggested that this is indeed occurring today in 
the form of increased foreign listings on U.S. exchanges,S3 as a 
means by which issuers can avoid the chill that comes from being 
incorporated in a country with inferior investor protection. Even if 
listings fall in the face of fragmentation, such a system could be 
sustained simply by having foreign issuers "rent" some other 
country's regulation. 
We shall return to this possibility in the next section. But for 
now, simply recognize that in the latter event, we would no longer 
be using trading site as the basis for jurisdiction, but rather "issuer 
consent." It is a new basis for jurisdiction that would apply even 
when the issuer, the trader, the source, and the trading site are 
outside the borders of the country in question. 
IV. Sorting Out the Claims: Toward an Issuer-based Emphasis 
To the extent that exchanges and trading locations remain 
important places to which a nation could meaningfully devote 
regulatory resources in such a way as to capture the benefits of 
regulation for its constituents, basing insider trading jurisdiction on 
that nexus alone seems appropriate. However, as I have just 
suggested, I doubt that that system is stable in light of the potential 
for rapid fragmentation and globalization of trading locations. To 
the extent that this occurs, we are likely to observe a system of 
international securities regulation in which mUltiple trading sites 
52. See Stephen Choi & Andrew Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the 
International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 So. CAL. L. REv. 903 (1998). For a 
similar thesis, see Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to 
Securities Regulation, 107 YALE LJ. 2359 (1998). 
53. See Coffee, supra note 47. 
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will be regulated simply to assure proper execution of orders 
without undue conflicts of interest, with little or no claim by either 
the sites or the regulatory authorities as to matters relating to the 
governance or disclosure policies of issuers whose shares can be 
traded on them. 
If this is the world toward which we are moving, then a shift in 
regulatory philosophy is needed-for insider trading as well as 
securities regulation generally. The clear-cut candidate to fill the 
void would be an emphasis on domestic issuers.54 Even if we 
assume little about who the shareholders of domestic corporations 
are (Le., the extent to which they are citizens of the issuer's home 
country), a country's interest in the reputation of its domestic 
issuers for controlling agency costs is compelling. If the U.S., for 
example, can make its domestic issuers attractive in the world's 
trading markets by stamping its brand of insider trading regulation 
on them, then the benefits in terms of cost of capital and allocative 
efficiency will be considerable. And given the relative mobility of 
the idea of "site of incorporation" - whether one defines that in 
terms of the site of incorporation or principal place of business-
there will be obvious incentives to adopt relatively efficient forms 
of regulation lest issuers be penalized by the markets and/or move 
elsewhere. Identifying the issuer's home country as the primary 
insider trading regulator also has the benefit of enforcement 
efficiency: usually, though not inevitably, the investigation of 
insider trading begins with people and data associated with the 
issuer. 55 Having said this, I would agree that there is also a good 
case for encouraging nations to use their enforcement powers to 
protect the reputations of domestic financial intermediaries and 
service providers (i.e., Britain in our hypothetical). 
Beyond this, the interesting question is whether a country 
should seek to rent out its form of regulation, permitting foreign 
issuers simply to commit to obeying its law (and devoting 
enforcement resources so as to bond the issuer's commitment) as a 
way of escaping inferior securities regulation in their home 
countries. As noted earlier, we arguably have this kind of system 
today, in terms of secondary listings on major exchanges, which has 
the effect of triggering that country's securities laws in nearly full 
force. Even if I am correct that listings are no longer a stable base, 
54. This is the clear-cut recommendation of Fox, supra note 16, albeit for 
somewhat different reasons than expressed here. 
55. See supra p. 4. 
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the commitment could eventually be made to the regulatory 
authorities directly. 
While this idea has substantial theoretical appeal, I am 
skeptical of its workability. The key issue is one of economics. 
Given that the benefits of the regulation will largely be external, 
issuers would have to be willing to pay a tax to make it worthwhile 
for the regulator to act. In this regard, note the high enforcement 
costs (not to mention legal and practical difficulties) associated with 
investigations that have an almost exclusively extraterritorial 
character. The tax, in other words, would likely be fairly high to 
cover the costs. To predict that issuers will indeed choose to pay it, 
each of the following would have to be true: 
(1) markets would have to be sufficiently efficient to price 
the added value of the regulation with some degree of 
precision;56 
(2) regulating nations would have to make a sufficient 
investment in extraterritorial regulation that the markets 
would assume the quality of not only the law on the 
books but also the willingness to devote resources to 
extraterritorial cases - notwithstanding domestic political 
pressures to shift those resources secretly in other 
directions;57 
(3) issuer home countries would have to be willing to 
cooperate with the regulating jurisdiction in order to 
enable its enforcement;58 and 
(4) managers of the issuer must be willing irrevocably to 
submit to this external jurisdiction to gain the benefits of 
a better stock price notwithstanding the personal costs 
associated with moving to a stricter regime.59 
56. For skepticism on this, see Cox, supra note 47, at 1233-35. 
57. Given the opaque nature of governmental enforcement, there needs to be 
some bonding mechanism by which investors can take confidence that there will be 
appropriate enforcement not only now, but in the future. Some scholars point to 
Delaware as a state that, in corporate law, has succeeded in making a credible 
commitment to the capital marketplace about the stable quality of its law. Note, 
however, some unique features about Delaware. First, it assigns enforcement 
capacity to private parties, not public enforcement. Second, it has a near 
monopoly on public company incorporations (and is highly dependent on the 
resulting revenues), giving it a unique incentive to act responsively. 
58. Ironically, as regulatory responsibility shifted largely to a handful of 
nations that could specialize in investor protection, the incentive for other 
countries to build a solid infrastructure for securities enforcement would diminish. 
59. For skepticism on this, see Lucian Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of 
Path Dependence in Corporate Governance and Ownership, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 
(1999). 
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There is nothing theoretically impossible about this, my suspicion is 
that one or more of them are likely to prove untrue. If so, it is hard 
to envision such a system being built and sustained for some time. 
In the intermediate-term, then, the sensible future of cross-border 
insider trading enforcement is one that assigns to countries the task 
of protecting of their own issuers and, derivatively, the investors in 
those issuers. 
I use the phrase "intermediate term," however, because in a 
globalized capital marketplace, I am not even sure that issuer 
domicile (however defined) is a sustainable standard. With respect 
to truly multi-national companies, whose shareholders, managers 
and other functional elements have no strong connection to any 
given country, I find it difficult to believe that anyone country will 
use its scarce domestic investigatory and prosecutorial resources 
aggressively to regulate insider trading. The enforcement costs to 
be borne by that country are great, while the benefits go in 
substantial part to foreign investors and intermediaries. While 
some system of taxing issuers might be found, I have some doubts 
about whether domestic agencies will really spend those resources 
on international policing (within the hidden bureaucratic world of 
prosecutorial discretion) when faced with competing claims 
involving stronger domestic connections. 
What, then, is the long-term solution? There are really only 
two possibilities, both involving the creation of a multi-national 
organization to which some of the tasks of insider trading 
surveillance and enforcement (coupled, obviously, with a large 
chunk of the work of securities regulation) is given. Conceivably, 
this could be a private self-regulatory organization, playing some-
thing of the role that exchanges do today. While some of the work 
of international securities regulation could fit into such an 
organization, I doubt that it works for insider trading. SRO's are 
workable vehicles for coordinating the behavior of business actors 
with reputational interests in continuing to be a member in good 
standing of the community. But insider trading does not involve 
that: it involves a wide variety of persons, insiders and outsiders, 
who see a chance at quick profits. The necessary alternative, then, 
is a public international organization - IOSCO recharacterized on a 
grand scale-with full criminal and civil power.60 We are far from 
having such a body, with self-evident and perhaps insuperable 
60. For a comparable claim within the European context, see Roberta S. 
Karmel, The Case for a European Securities Commission, 38 COLUM. J. TRANS. L. 
9 (1999). 
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political difficulties standing in the way of its creation. My end 
point simply is this: absent such an organization, the problems 
associated with cross-border insider trading enforcement will grow 
without much hope of satisfactory deterrence. 
